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ABSTRACT
Background and aim Cryptomarkets—on-line, anonymous market-places for illicit goods and services that specialize
mainly in drugs—account for a small but rapidly growing share of the illicit drug market in many countries. Policy re-
sponses so far are based generally on the assumption that their rise will only increase drug harms. In this contribution
for debate, we question this assumption.Methods We provide a narrative review of the emerging literature connected
to drug cryptomarkets. We use MacCoun & Reuter’s formula to understand the effect of population-level increases in use
on total harm as depending on the level of harm associated with each unit of use. We then consider the potential for
cryptomarkets to increase or decrease the harms and beneﬁts related to each unit of drug use, with speciﬁc attention to
the quality of drugs sold and the non-drug-related harms and beneﬁts for customers. Results It is likely that
cryptomarkets will increase both the amount and the range of substances that are sold. However, we argue that the effects
on harms will depend upon whether cryptomarkets also increase the quality and safety of products that are sold, provide
harm-reducing information to consumers and reduce transactional conﬂict involved in drug purchasing.
Conclusions There is an emerging and rapidly growing evidence base connected to the macro and micro harms and
beneﬁts of cryptomarkets for drug users. Future researchers should use appropriately matched comparative designs to es-
tablish more ﬁrmly the differential harms and beneﬁts of sourcing drugs both on- and off-line. While it is unlikely that the
on-line drug trade can be eradicated completely, cryptomarkets will respond to regulation and enforcement in ways that
have complex, and sometimes unanticipated, effects on both harms and beneﬁts.
Keywords Cryptomarkets, darknet, drug dealing, drug harms, drug prices, drug quality, harm reduction, illegal drug
use, risk reduction, risk taking.
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INTRODUCTION
Cryptomarkets are on-line market-places that host multi-
ple sellers or ‘vendors’; provide participants with anonym-
ity though their hidden web location and payment by
cryptocurrencies such as ‘bitcoin’; and aggregate and dis-
play customer feedback ratings and comments [1].
Transacting anonymously, buyers and sellers of illegal
drugs thereby evade world-wide prohibitive controls; only
a small proportion of postal deliveries can feasibly be
intercepted by authorities. The cryptomarket drug trade
is a growing area of interest for criminologists [2,3], public
health researchers [4,5], drug policy analysts [6] and for
law enforcement and policymakers [7,8]. Cryptomarkets
offer a new channel for global drug diffusion [9]. While
the proportion of drug users who report cryptomarket buy-
ing is currently small, research evidence using multiple
methodologies points to an increase [10,11]. Cryptomarket
drug sales nearly tripled from September 2013, with reve-
nue estimated to be more than USD $14million per month
in 2016 [12]. Although mainstream media reports tend to
focus upon the dangers posed by cryptomarkets [13], there
has been limited speciﬁc examination of what harms
cryptomarkets may produce for users, or ways in which
cryptomarkets may reduce drug-related harm while in-
creasing beneﬁts to market participants.
Our aim here is to stimulate debate connected to the mi-
cro- and macro-level harms and beneﬁts that arise from dif-
ferent types of retail drug markets, of which cryptomarkets
are one recent development. MacCoun & Reuter [14]
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conceptualize drug harm as resulting not just from the phar-
macological effects of drugs, but also from the wider context
within which illegal drugs are produced, trafﬁcked, sold and
consumed. They have suggested that the effect of popula-
tion-level increases in use on total harm will depend upon
the level of harm associated with each unit of use, expressed
in this formula: total harm = prevalence (number of
users) × intensity (units/user) × harmfulness (harm/unit).
Following this suggestion, we consider the potential for
cryptomarkets to increase or decrease the harms and bene-
ﬁts related to each unit of drug use, with speciﬁc attention to
the quality of drugs sold and the non-drug-related harms
and beneﬁts for customers. We also consider population
level effects, including prevalence and intensity of drug
use. We alert readers to a growing research literature on
cryptomarkets, and set out a number of questions we urge
researchers to address in order to provide the evidence
needed to inform policy and promote public health.
HOW MIGHT CRYPTOMARKETS AFFECT
DRUG QUALITY, PRICE AND PURCHASE-
RELATED RISKS?
Are cryptomarket purchased drugs of higher quality?
Cryptomarket vendors will have only limited capacity to
control the quality of substances they sell. Cryptomarkets
are ‘anchored’ in off-line drug markets [9], with products
sourced ultimately within markets subject to the myriad
factors that affect drug quality locally and globally [15].
However, might cryptomarket vendors be more likely than
their off-line counterparts to sell ‘as advertised’ substances
rather than substitutes, and less likely to adulterate their
supplies with bulking agents that lower drug purity?
One reason this might be the case is that cryptomarket
feedback systems allow customers to ‘comparison shop’
among vendors selling similar products and make judge-
ments on the basis of accumulating product/vendor reputa-
tion scores [16]. Because cryptomarkets bring together
multiple vendors for particular substances in a potentially
global market-place [3], drug buyers can locate alternative
sellers more easily. This ease contrasts with traditional, off-
line drug markets where ‘search costs’ [17] are higher due
to limited information available to buyers about alternatives,
alongside the risks such searches carry [18]. As
cryptomarket vendors have considerable scope to describe
their products, customers can access more product quality
information than would be feasible in off-line illicit markets
[19]. Many cryptomarket vendors specify clearly the quality
and purity of their products; some even provide chemical
test results ostensibly backing up their claims [3]. Moreover,
payments are typically held in ‘escrow’ by the market-place
and released to sellers only when customers receive their
purchases [20]. Buyers dissatisﬁed with product quality
have recourse by leaving negative feedback [16]. Together,
these factors may make vendors more accountable, with
buyers, in turn, more likely to obtain ‘as advertised’ and
higher-quality products than those buying off-line.
Research evidence is emerging in support of this possi-
bility. Customer feedback is open to manipulation by ven-
dors [16], but with most vendors holding perfect (5/5)
feedback scores [21], it appears that cryptomarket-
purchased drugs meet or exceed the expectations of the
majority of buyers. Interviews with cryptomarket cus-
tomers highlight product quality as a key reason for
accessing drugs in this way [22–24]. User satisfaction,
however, is at best a weak indicator of product quality
[25]. Testing the content and purity of drugs provides a
more robust benchmark. Two comparative studies using
this methodology have been published to date. Forensic
tests of 219 Spanish user-submitted cryptomarket drug
purchases revealed that in 90% of samples the content
matched the advertised substance, with purity for cocaine,
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), amphet-
amine, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), cannabis and
ketamine substantially exceeding samples that service
users sourced off-line [26]. Similar but less pronounced dif-
ferences were found with user-submitted samples to the
Dutch Drug Information Monitoring System (DIMS). The
average purity of samples of drugs obtained on-line tended
to be higher than off-line purchases, and statistically signif-
icantly so for three of nine substance types [11].
Cryptomarket-sourced drugs are not, however, immune
to adulteration. Four samples submitted to the above-
mentioned Spanish testing service, reportedly advertised
as heroin on cryptomarkets, actually contained the novel
opioid ocfentanil [27]. Misreporting of substance purity
by cryptomarket vendors was identiﬁed by Swiss re-
searchers, who bought and tested four samples. While
tested content matched advertised content, test results
conﬁrmed lower purity than vendors advertised [28].
Relationships of trust that develop between dealer and
customer in off-line markets may function similarly to
make off-line dealers accountable to their repeat cus-
tomers; a social relationship which may be culturally nor-
malized in some off-line markets [29,30] and incentivized
by law enforcement practices in others [31]. So while
cryptomarket vendors may provide higher-quality prod-
ucts than off-line dealers who base their business model
on selling to strangers, the comparison with dealers who
transact only with buyers that they already know may be
less predictable. Future research assessing cryptomarket-
sourced drug quality would beneﬁt by comparisons within
off-line drug market subtypes.
Are cryptomarket-purchased drugs less expensive?
Cryptomarkets enable their users to access market-place
information about price. Buyers can compare prices among
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vendors and vendors can set prices informed by unprece-
dented knowledge of their local and international compet-
itors [21]. This abundance of market-place data should
reduce the ‘information asymmetries’ inherent in illicit
markets [32]. Drug dealers operating off-line are thought
to capitalize on these information voids with increased
prices: one reason economists use to explain the compara-
tively high prices for illegal goods. High prices for illicit
goods also partly reﬂect the compensation that suppliers
seek for bearing these risks [33]. If cryptomarket sales are
also less risky for anonymous on-line vendors than off-line
drug selling, this may reduce prices further; but alongside
the factors that may reduce price, other factors unique to
on-line selling may exert the opposite effect. First,
cryptomarkets take a commission on each transaction,
typically between 2 and 4% of the price [34]. Secondly, par-
cel loss or interception by borders ofﬁcials are understood
by vendors as costs of doing business [21]. Although simi-
lar losses will occur for off-line retail drug dealers (e.g. sei-
zure, theft or ‘taxing’), these seem likely to be more
frequent and therefore costly for on-line sellers. Thirdly,
postage, alongside costs entailed by ‘stealth’ packaging de-
signed to reduce suspect cues of package contents [35],
may increase costs and therefore price. Self-reports by
cryptomarket buyers suggest that lower price may be a
key reason for sourcing drugs in this way [36,37], but dif-
ferences may vary by drug type, with some substances re-
ported by cryptomarket customers to be more expensive
than might be obtained locally off-line [23].
Three studies provide comparative evidence on price.
The DIMS study (discussed above) additionally asked users
submitting samples for testing to report the price paid for
the drug. Prices were, in the main, signiﬁcantly higher for
on- than off-line-purchased drugs [11]. The other studies
employed a different methodology. Drug prices extracted
from cryptomarket listings were compared to street drug
prices listed in ofﬁcial sources. Cryptomarket prices were
mainly higher than street drug prices in 10 countries
[38]. By contrast, drug prices available to Australians were
substantially lower for cryptomarket-sourced drugs com-
pared to relatively high street prices in this country [39].
Although these studies do not uniformly support the
hypothesis that cryptomarket regulatory mechanisms
might function to reduce drug prices, the question remains
open for two reasons. First, neither study reported prices
adjusted for purity; given evidence of higher purity for
on-line-purchased drugs [11,26], purity-adjusted compar-
isons are essential. We would also suggest that researchers
making price comparisons need to adjust for quantities/
weights received by customers. Drug dealers in off-line
markets report regularly selling deals under the stated
weight [40,41], a ﬁnding corroborated by law enforcement
seizures of drugs found consistently to be packaged in un-
derweight deals at the retail and wholesale level [Drug
Expert Witness and Valuation Ofﬁcers Association, per-
sonal communication]. Bycomparison, cryptomarket deals
may be at or above the advertised weight, given the system
incentives described above in relation to drug quality. Re-
cent forensic evidence is indicative, with the average
weight of cryptomarket-purchased cocaine samples
slightly exceeding the advertised weight [Rhumorbarbe
et al., personal communication]. Future research using ap-
propriately comparative designs that control for both pu-
rity and quantity purchased is required to establish price
differentials ﬁrmly between off- and on-line-sourced drugs.
Are cryptomarket purchases less risky for drug buyers?
In off-line retail drugmarkets, buyers face a number of risks
connected to their transactions. They may be cheated: sold
a product of which the quality or quantity is not as adver-
tised [39]. In these ‘lemon’ markets [32], quality is
ascertained only after the point of purchase. Although ar-
rests per retail transaction are few [42], drug-buying
carries the risk of apprehension by law enforcement and
while violence is lower in retail markets than in wholesale
supply activities [43], buyers in retail drug markets never-
theless risk threats and violence [44]. These risks may be
moderated by relationships of trust [45,46] facilitated by
face-to-face interactions, particularly in ‘closed’ market-
places in which most drug sales now occur, where dealers
sell only to known or ‘vouched for’ new customers [47].
Might the regulatory mechanisms of cryptomarkets recon-
ﬁgure the transaction-related risks faced by drug buyers?
The virtual location of drug cryptomarkets, combined
with anonymity provided by hidden web location and use
of cryptocurrencies for payment, should function to reduce
possibilities for violent confrontation [3,9]. Emerging evi-
dence suggests that conﬂict resolution on cryptomarkets
is primarily peaceable—typically, third-party intervention
by marketplace administrators—with threats of blackmail
rare, and of violence even more rare [48]. Interviews with
cryptomarket buyers and sellers suggest that both are mo-
tivated by a desire to transact without the fear of violence
associated with face-to-face trading [49].
Compelling comparative evidence of drug purchase-
related risks of violence is provided in recent survey
research. Cryptomarket buyers reported fewer threats to
personal safety and violence than reported in connection
to sourcing through known dealers, strangers and even
friends. Regarding comparative rip-off risks, evidence was
mixed. Some experiences of cheating were more common
for cryptomarket-buying (losses due to scams on the mar-
ket-place; paying for drugs not received), and others more
common when buying off-line (being overcharged; receiv-
ing low/variable purity products). Respondents were three
times more likely to report being caught by law enforce-
ment in connection to their off-line drug buying than
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reported for cryptomarket purchases, suggesting that
cryptomarket buying may reduce the risk of arrest [50].
Cryptomarket buyers, however, are not immune to this
risk. Publicly available information was used to catalogue
cryptomarket-related arrests world-wide up to December
2016 [51]. Of 391 arrests of buyers and sellers, most
(58%) were buyers. Even if law enforcement prioritizes
the apprehension of drug suppliers over users, it may be
easier to trace cryptomarket shipments to their intended
recipients than to the sellers shipping them. Many arrests
were effected not through sophisticated technology for
breaking anonymity and encryption, but in connection to
the off-line activities; in particular, making and receiving
deliveries. These off-line activities are indeed the very loca-
tions in which cryptomarket users themselves identify vul-
nerability to arrest [35].
There are limits on the extent to which cryptomarkets
may reduce drug market violence. The vast majority of
the cryptomarket drug trade is generated by cannabis, ec-
stasy-type drugs, and psychedelics [12], rather than drugs
such as cocaine and heroin that are associated with com-
paratively high market violence [14,52]. Violence related
to the control of production, smuggling and wholesale sup-
ply may be relatively unaffected by cryptomarkets, as long
as these activities remain illegal and highly proﬁtable.
However, it seems likely that strategies other than violence
for the resolution of transactional conﬂict are likely to pre-
dominate in cryptomarkets. More research is required to
tease out the comparative conﬁguration of risks of scams,
violence and arrest across drug market types.
WILL CRYPTOMARKETS INCREASE
DRUG USE?
Drug cryptomarkets may generate increased population-
level drug use in three ways. Because these market-places
enable drug sellers to transact with customers across
widespread locations, customers gain access to sub-
stances not otherwise available to them locally. Most
common are recreational and ‘party’ drugs such as can-
nabis and ecstasy-type substances, alongside a wide
range of psychedelic drugs, prescription medications and
constantly emerging ‘new psychoactive substances’
(NPS). Less common are substances associated typically
with problem drug use, such as heroin and methamphet-
amine [2,53–55]. Some cryptomarket buyers cite ‘greater
range’ as key in their decisions to source drugs in this
way [37]. Cryptomarkets are likely, therefore, to provide
a new mechanism for the diffusion of speciﬁc drugs into
new locales in which they were previously unavailable
[9]. They may also produce a ‘supply gateway’ effect,
where customers seeking one particular substance en-
counter many others. Cryptomarkets may therefore in-
crease the population prevalence of the use of particular
drugs by widening the repertoires of those who are al-
ready drug users.
Secondly, cryptomarkets may make available drugs to
those who would not otherwise have accessed them
through traditional markets, thereby increasing the popu-
lation prevalence of drug users. A critical question, then,
is whether cryptomarkets simply replace conventional
trade or supplement it by bringing in new buyers [56].
The latter derives from the possibility that some potential
drug users may lack the knowledge and contacts required
to access drugs in off-line markets, or may be reluctant or
deterred from doing so, but comparatively comfortable in
making purchases in an anonymous, virtual market-place.
By bringing in ‘new’ drug users cryptomarkets may boost
drug user numbers, potentially reinforced by increased
drug quality and lower price. There is also a third, indirect,
route. By selling in wholesale amounts to dealers who sell
off-line [9], cryptomarkets may effectively boost availability
even in off-line markets, and so contribute to higher drug
use/user prevalence at a population level.
If the examples of tobacco and alcohol are relevant to
other psychoactive substances, then we would expect in-
creased availability and reduced prices to lead to increased
prevalence of use [57–60]. The majority of drug users ac-
cess drugs from friends, colleagues, neighbours or family
members [61]. Therefore, it may seem unlikely that lack
of access to illicit markets is a major barrier for people
whowould like to use drugs but have abstained from doing
so. Nevertheless, qualitative interviews with cryptomarket
users (n = 17) have established that, for a small subgroup,
use of cryptomarkets has marked the start of their drug
use, due either to having no social supply contacts or being
unwilling to access drugs through off-line means [62].
Large quantity/price purchases generate substantial rev-
enue on cryptomarkets [9] with sizeable quantity discounts
[2], making possible bulk purchase for personal use.
Cryptomarket drug buyers may therefore intensify their
use: increasing drug use frequency and/or quantity con-
sumed per session. Interviews with a small number of
cryptomarket buyers suggest this possibility, with the major-
ity reporting increased frequency of drug use in the months
following initial cryptomarket participation, before tapering
down; a so-called ‘honeymoon’ effect [62]. Retrospective
self-report study designs provide only limited evidence for
the changing effects on use connected to cryptomarket ac-
cess. Establishing these effects requires longitudinal research
designs with substantial follow-up periods.
To the extent that cryptomarkets may function to in-
crease the range and intensityof drugs used at the individual
level and contribute to overall increases in population prev-
alence, this seems likely to apply primarily to the users of
drug types that dominate cryptomarket selling: cannabis
and ecstasy-type substances. Cryptomarket buying requires
technological resources and skill, and purchases made days
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in advance of intended consumption. Cryptomarkets may
therefore not be a direct source of supply for many people
with the most problematic patterns of drug use.
HOW MIGHT DRUG CRYPTOMARKETS
AFFECT OVERALL HARMS AND BENEFITS?
We have suggested that if cryptomarkets continue to grow,
we may see increases in the number of drug users in the
population, their individual drug-taking repertoires and
the intensity of their use. MacCoun & Reuter’s equation
([14], pp. 329–31) suggests that harms are dynamic. Total
harm will not depend simply upon the prevalence of use,
but also on the intensity of use and harms per unit of use.
Theremay be feedback effects between each element of this
equation; increased perceptions of harmfulness per unit of
use may reduce population prevalence; and the greater
sharing of information between users that cryptomarkets
enable may speed up such dynamics.
MacCoun & Reuter’s equation could also be adapted to
think about beneﬁts of drug use. While there is a growing
literature on the categorization and analysis of drug-
related harms [14,63–66], beneﬁts of drug use are studied
much less frequently. They obviously exist, otherwise drug
use would be far more rare than it is. People use drugs for a
variety of reasons, most of which are volitional rather than
dependent [67,68]. Users may derive pleasure, enhanced
capacities for work and study, social bonds with other drug
users and a variety of other beneﬁts [69–72]. With sub-
stantial sales of prescription drugs on cryptomarkets, many
customers may be self-medicating physical and psycholog-
ical ill health, and in spite of the potential risks of doing so,
some researchers have identiﬁed accompanying beneﬁts of
self-medication [73], even with non-prescribed opiate sub-
stitutes [74].
There are also beneﬁts to drug users in their being
able to access the drug they seek rather than unantici-
pated substitutes, a problem illustrated by the off-line sale
of N-methoxybenzyl (NBOMe) compounds such as LSD
[75] and fentanyl as heroin [76]. If cryptomarket cus-
tomers are indeed more likely to receive the drug they ex-
pected to purchase, they should be less likely to
experience unwanted or unexpected effects, and in turn
the harms associated with those effects. ‘Purer’—and
therefore higher strength—is not always better: overdoses
can increase when a purer product enters the market
and users do not adjust their doses accordingly [77],
and recent reports of ‘super-strength’ MDMA may be
linked to deaths [78]. Disentangling the overall harms
and beneﬁts of higher-quality substances, even ‘as adver-
tised’, is not straightforward. However, many people who
take drugs would see increases in quality as beneﬁcial,
particularly when coupled with reductions in price and
transactional risk.
Cryptomarkets may also provide beneﬁts to drug takers
through the provision of harm reduction information. The
internet has massively expanded access to information
about illegal drugs. From the 1990s, user-centred discus-
sion forums and websites (e.g. Erowid, Bluelight) have
emerged that facilitate drug harm reduction and beneﬁt
maximization information-sharing. Websites such as these
enable drug users to access and generate ‘folk pharmacol-
ogies’ [79] or ‘lay epidemiologies’ [80], including informa-
tion about dosing, determining drug content and purity,
environments for use and combining drugs [81]. Drug
cryptomarkets go a step further. Caudevilla [82] has ar-
gued that cryptomarkets and their associated discussion fo-
rums provide a step-change beneﬁt for drug users: ‘vendors
communicate directly with users in forums, announce
when a new batch of a substance is available, provide
and share advice about safer use and openly discuss quality,
purity, adulterants’. Harm reduction/beneﬁt maximization
advice on cryptomarkets can be accessed at the very loca-
tion of drug purchase, whereas discussion forums hosted in
the surface web typically have policies that prohibit discus-
sions about drug sourcing, to protect their members and
their organizations’ reputation [83]. Caudevilla’s own dis-
cussion thread on various cryptomarkets (‘Ask a Drug Ex-
pert Physician about Drugs and Health’) is one
illustration of how these market-places allow users not just
access to user-generated ‘folkwisdom’, but also to specialist
advice and information from a qualiﬁed harm-reduction
drug professional.
Not all user-generated discussions will provide accurate
or contextually appropriate advice, and one risk of these
forms of peer support is that groupmembers may act on in-
appropriate information or may increase or sustain even
harmful drug usage patterns within a context that
normalizses use [84]. As with cryptomarkets themselves,
there are mechanisms through which engagement with
discussion forums may affect both beneﬁts and harms.
Future research should aim to assess the quality of harm
reduction information on cryptomarkets and will beneﬁt
by comparisons to that made available by drug dealers
in off-line markets [85].
The results of research on the effects on harm per unit
of use will need to be combined in models with ﬁndings on
the prevalence of use and its intensity if we are to generate
a more accurate picture of the harms and beneﬁts that
arise from cryptomarket drug sales. Such models will need
to be sophisticated enough to deal with effects that may be
multiple, interactive and non-linear.
CONCLUSION
We have examined the complex effects of cryptomarkets
on drug quality, price and transactional risk, allowing
us to consider the consequences on range and prevalence
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of use and on associated harms and beneﬁts. Due to the
limitations of currently available research, these consider-
ations are proposed not as a list of predictions, but as sug-
gestions to stimulate both debate and further research on
the effects of cryptomarkets. These effects will be hard to
discern at the population level while the market share of
cryptomarkets remains small. We need to continue to de-
velop a range of new tools to address the issues raised
here, including innovative modelling, survey and ethno-
graphic studies, as well as new ‘digital trace’ methods
that harness the unprecedented drug market data that
can be extracted directly from cryptomarkets [2,9,52,86].
Not all forms of illicit drug trading are equally harmful
[87,88]. MacCoun & Reuter’s equation [14] helps us to
think about how cryptomarkets may increase drug harms
through some mechanisms (e.g. increased range and in-
tensity of drug use) but reduce them through others
(e.g. better information on drug contents); and, similarly,
increase some transactional risks (e.g. rip-offs) while re-
ducing others (e.g. violence, arrest). The extent and na-
ture of these harms and beneﬁts will, importantly, also
be affected by policy responses. Even if law-enforcement
actors cannot resolve the encryption of cryptomarkets,
they will continue to develop techniques for intervention.
For example, market manipulation may increase both the
ﬁnancial price and the risks of buying drugs on-line by
increasing uncertainty and reducing trust between
buyers and sellers (e.g. fake vendor/buyer proﬁles,
targeted site shutdowns, rumour-mongering). In deciding
on these or other forms of intervention, policy makers
will need to consider carefully how drug markets will in-
novate in response [35] and pay particular attention to
potential unintended consequences. As with off-line sales,
it is unlikely that the on-line drug trade can be eradicated
completely; cryptomarkets will, however, respond to regu-
lation and enforcement in ways that have complex effects
on both the harms and beneﬁts.
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